Trump’s ‘Monroe Doctrine 2.0’ risks stalling Latin America’s growth

Latin America faces a critical infrastructure deficit that threatens its economic competitiveness, yet the United States’ renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere under the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025 may worsen the problem, analysts warn.

The NSS, which frames the so-called “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, calls for blocking foreign companies from controlling strategic assets in the region, a policy that could perpetuate underdevelopment, hinder investment, and exacerbate migration to the US, according to Jorge Heine, writing for Responsible Statecraft.

China steps into a region in need of infrastructure
The Chilean scholar, diplomat, and foreign-policy analyst explained that decades of underinvestment in ports, highways, railways, bridges, and tunnels have left Latin America struggling with high logistics costs, estimated at 14–18 percent per export unit, compared with an OECD average of 8 percent.

The Economist Intelligence Unit projects that the region requires $250 billion annually between 2024 and 2028 to close this gap. Without substantial investment, Latin American exports remain less competitive, contributing to low growth and economic stagnation. Since 2010, Chinese construction firms have increasingly filled the region’s infrastructure void.

One high-profile example is Peru’s Chancay port, a $1.3 billion project built by the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) and inaugurated in November 2024, now the most modern port on South America’s West Coast. Analysts note that Chinese companies succeed partly because US construction firms often avoid regional projects due to size or capacity constraints, while European firms are frequently too expensive to compete.

China has become Latin America’s largest trading partner, underscoring its growing economic influence.
Trump’s NSS and its critics
The NSS 2025 emphasizes American control over “strategically vital assets” in the hemisphere and urges that the US “make every effort to push out foreign companies that build infrastructure in the region.”

Heine argues that this approach mirrors the early 20th-century Roosevelt Corollary, which justified US military interventions in Central America and the Caribbean. He warns that conflating geopolitical competition with development needs could stall projects essential for economic growth.

Geopolitical and economic misreading
Heine notes that the NSS underestimates the reality that Asia, led by China, is the fastest-growing global economic region and that Latin America’s trade and investment links with China will continue to expand. Attempting to block non-Hemispheric partners is widely seen as impractical and could deepen underdevelopment and drive continued migration northward.

Military focus, economic contradictions
Alongside its economic stance, the NSS calls for a “readjustment” of US military posture, reflected in the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford and accompanying vessels off Venezuela, as well as controversial maritime operations against alleged drug traffickers.

Critics argue that emphasizing military power while restricting foreign investment sends mixed signals and risks alienating regional partners, leaving a vacuum that China and other external powers are already filling.

While a renewed US focus on the Americas may be justified, Heine and other analysts warn that pairing it with policies that discourage foreign investment risks perpetuating the underdevelopment the strategy claims to address. Latin America, they argue, requires robust infrastructure, capital, and international cooperation, not exclusionary measures that could hinder its growth and stability.